We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player i has about the profile of true valuations, θ * , consists of a set of distributions, from one of which θ * i has been drawn. We analyze the social-welfare performance of the VCG mechanism, for unrestricted combinatorial auctions, when Knightian players that either (a) choose a regret-minimizing strategy, or (b) resort to regret minimization only to refine further their own sets of undominated strategies, if needed.
Introduction
In [CMZ14b] we motivate the problem of mechanism design for Knightian players, and prove that (1) dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-good and multi-unit auctions cannot provide good social-welfare efficiency, but (2) the second-price and Vickrey mechanisms deliver good social-welfare performance, for these two settings, in undominated strategies.
In this report, we prove that the VCG mechanism guarantees good social welfare in the presence of Knightian players who either (a) choose a regret-minimizing strategy, or (b) resort to regret minimization only to refine further their own sets of undominated strategies, if needed.
Model
We study unrestricted combinatorial auctions, where there are n players and m dis- . If (A, P ) ∈ Ω, we refer P i as the price charged to player i. We assume quasi-linear utilities. That is, the utility function U i of a player i maps a valuation θ i and an outcome ω = (A, P ) to
If ω is a distribution over outcomes, we also denote by U i (θ i , ω) the expected utility of player i.
Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model, a player i's sole information about θ * consists of K i , a set of distributions over Θ i , from one of which θ * i has been drawn. (The true valuations are uncorrelated.) That is, K i is i's sole (and private) information about his own true valuation θ * i .
In Knightian valuation model, a mechanism's performance will of course depend on the inaccuracy of the players' candidate sets, which we measure as follows.
Definition 2.2. The candidate set K i of a player i is (at most) δ-approximate if, for
An auction is (at most) δ-approximate if each K i is δ-approximate. Mechanisms and strategies. A mechanism M specifies, for each player i, a set S i . We interchangeably refer to each member of S i as a pure strategy/action/report of i, and similarly, a member of ∆(S i ) a mixed strategy/action/report of i.
After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy s i in S i , M maps the reported strategy profile s to an outcome M (s) ∈ Ω.
1 Whatever the auction mechanism used, this equivalence holds for any auction where each Θ i is a convex set. In particular, this includes unrestricted combinatorial auctions of m distinct goods.
Note that S i = Θ i for the direct mechanisms in the classical setting.
The VCG mechanism. In our auctions, the VCG mechanism, denoted VCG, maps a profile of valuations θ ∈ Θ 1 × · · · × Θ n , to an outcome (A, P ), where A ∈ arg max A∈A SW(θ, A) and, for each player i,
Ties are broken by preferring subsets with smaller cardinalities.
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Knightian regret-minimizing strategies. Given a mechanism M , the (maximum) regret of a pure strategy s i of a player i with candidate set K i is
A pure strategy s i is regret-minimizing among all pure strategies of a player i with
. When allowing mixed strategies, the (expected) regret of a (possibly mixed) strategy σ i of a player i with candidate set K i is
.
We similarly define RM mix i (K i ) as the set of strategies of a player i that minimize regret among all mixed strategies, and let
Result
In δ-approximate combinatorial auctions with n players and m goods, the VCG guarantees social welfare ≥ MSW − 2 min{n, m}δ in pure regret-minimizing strategies:
Theorem 1. In a combinatorial Knightian auction with n players and m goods, for all δ, all products K of δ-approximate candidate sets, all profiles θ ∈ K, and all profiles of strategies v ∈ RM pure (K), it holds that
Discussion. Theorem 1 says that, in combinatorial Knightian auctions, the performance of the VCG in (pure) regret minimizing strategies is very good. Moreover, because of the result proved in [CMZ14a] , the same holds for when a player resorts to regret minimization only to refine further his own sets of undominated strategies. We would like to mention that Theorem 1 continues to hold when mixed regretminimizing strategies are allowed, but with a worse bound. Roughly, min{n, m} is replaced by n 2 (or even n log n if the valuations are set-monotone).
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Proof. We begin by noting that, because the VCG is dominant-strategy-truthful in the exact-valuation model, the (maximum) regret of a pure strategy v i of a player i with candidate set K i in the VCG mechanism becomes
Moreover, by the very definition of the VCG, we have
Therefore in the VCG case, we can further simplify the definition of regret as follows:
For each player i, each candidate set K i ⊂ Θ i , and each subset T ⊆ [m], we let
To prove Theorem 1, we rely on two intermediate claims. The first one identifies, for every player i, a strategy v i with regret no larger than δ.
Claim 3.1. For every player i, let v *
Proof of Claim 3.1. According to the first equality of (3.1), it suffices to show that
Recall that, in a combinatorial auction, a valuation θ i ∈ Θ i of player i maps subsets of [m] to R ≥0 . For convenience, we extend θ i to map an outcome ω = (A, P ) to R ≥0 as follows:
Under this notation, we have v
, because the VCG maximizes social welfare relative to the strategy profile (v * i , v −i ). Using this inequality, we deduce that
Suppose player i gets subset T 1 ⊆ [m] in outcome ω 1 , and subset T 2 ⊆ [m] in outcome ω 2 . Then
Let us now prove another claim.
Claim 3.2. Let v i be any strategy of player i such that
(a) for every T ⊆ [m]:
, and
Proof. Since the case of T = ∅ is trivial, we assume below that T = ∅. We first prove part (a).
Suppose that (a) is not true. Then, there exists T such that
We contradict our assumption on v i by showing that
To show R i (K i , v i ) > δ, as per (3.1), we must find some v −i and some θ i so that
Let j be an arbitrary player other than i. We choose θ i ∈ K i such that θ i (T ) = K i (T ), 6 and v −i as follows: for every S ⊆ [m]
0 otherwise and v k (S) def = 0 for every k ∈ {i, j}.
Above, ε > 0 is some sufficiently small real number, and H is some huge real number (that is, H is much bigger than v i (S) for any subset S). 7 It then is easy to verify that the outcome VCG(v i , v −i ) allocates ∅ to player i, and [m] to player j. Therefore,
On the other hand, MSW(
+ H, and therefore
, according to (3.2), there exists some sufficiently small ε > 0 to make
This proves (3.3) and concludes the proof of Claim 3.2a.
We now prove part Claim 3.2b.
One side of Claim 3.2b is easy: that is,
Indeed, this inequality follows from max T ⊆T v i (T ) = v i (T ) and Claim 3.2a.
To show the other side, that is,
, we again proceed by contradiction. Suppose there is some T such that
Similarly to case (a), we need to find some v −i and some θ i so that inequality (3.3) holds.
Let j be an arbitrary player other than i. This time, we choose θ i ∈ K i such that 6 Here we have implicitly assumed that K i (T ) = sup K i (T ) = max K i (T ), and thus we can pick θ i ∈ K i so that θ i (T ) = K i (T ). If this is not the case, one can construct an infinite sequence θ Again, ε > 0 is sufficiently small, and H is huge. 7 It then is easy to verify that the outcome VCG(v i , v −i ) allocates T to player i and T to player j. Therefore,
according to (3.4), there exists some sufficiently small ε > 0 to make
− ε > δ. This proves (3.3) and concludes the proof of Claim 3.2b.
In sum, Claim 3.2 holds. Now we return to the proof of Theorem 1. Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ RM pure (K) be a regret-minimizing pure strategy profile, and let θ ∈ K be a valuation profile.
For every player i, the strategy v * i (i.e., the one reporting the 'middle points') has a regret at most δ, owing to Claim 3.1. Since v i minimizes regret among all his strategies, we immediately have Furthermore, by our choice of the tie-breaking rule, this inequality must be strict:
that is, v i (A i ) > v i (T ) for any T A i . Therefore, letting T = A i , T satisfies the hypothesis in Claim 3.2b. Thus, we conclude that 
Also notice that, if B i = ∅, then θ i (B i ) = max T ⊆B i v i (T ) = 0.
We are now ready to compute the social welfare guarantee.
,B i =∅ δ (using (3.7))
≥ MSW(θ) − 2 min{n, m}δ .
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
